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Training Intelligence Producers and Consumers for
the Future: The Dutch Approach
Bob de Graaff

Introduction
Ambition and Effort
As one of the founders of the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association in 1991, and as
one of the first academics in the Netherlands who considered intelligence studies a serious
academic discipline it had been my longtime ambition to give intelligence studies an
established position at one of the Dutch universities. So, when Utrecht University offered me
a so-called profiling chair, intended to develop a new academic discipline within the domain
of history, and informed me that I could pick any topic I would like, it did not take long for
me to label my chair as “Intelligence and security studies.” This position being a three-daysa-week job, the Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA) offered me almost simultaneously a
two-days-a-week chair in the same field. The latter resulted from the wish of the Dutch
Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst,
MIVD) to establish intelligence studies as an academic master. After the failure to create a
combined master in intelligence at the Utrecht University and the NLDA, the Commander of
the Netherlands Army issued in early 2012 a requirement order for the Netherlands Defense
Academy to have a master in intelligence studies up and running by the beginning of 2013.
This was quite a tall order for several reasons. Firstly, every academic master study in the
Netherlands has to be accredited by the Netherlands-Flemish Accreditation Organization
(NVAO) before it can start, a process that often takes two years and even so is a process with
an uncertain outcome. Secondly, after a proliferation of master studies the Dutch universities
had just previously agreed to reduce the number of master studies. Establishing a new one
was rowing against the tide. Thirdly, the NLDA was not a full-grown university yet. Just a
few months prior to the Commander’s requirement order, it had its bachelor program
accredited, a process that took almost ten years. And finally, being part of the Ministry of
Defense, which was hit hardest of all ministries by the governments austerity measures, the
NLDA had to cut back its staff by 25 percent. Creating a new activity with a downsized staff
demanded some creative thinking.
However, with a military can-do mentality which contrasted pleasantly with the tardiness of
academic decision-making at regular universities the NLDA decided to make an effort to
achieve an even greater objective. In order to use this window of opportunity, which might be
closed for long time in the future, it was decided to develop a master in military strategic
studies as an umbrella over three different tracks, viz war studies, military management and
logistics, and intelligence and security. The whole development stage took only three months,
so that by the end of June 2012 the concept of the program could be sent abroad to reviewers
in North America for external validation, one for each of the tracks. They sent in positive
comments, which led to elaboration of a few items in the program, but were no hindrance for
the next stage: the internal validation by reviewers from Western Europe, again one for each
track, an independent chairman and staff from the Netherlands-Flemish Accreditation
Organization (NVAO). Their main comments were that the program was tasking both
students and staff too heavily, but these were comments that could be easily addressed, just as
suggestions for a different build-up of the courses and the examinations. Through this
88
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5

accreditation of the master program the NLDA has now in essence become a full fledged
university comparable with civilian uiniversities in the Netherlands.
Consequently, a pilot started in February, which accomodated only Defense personnel. From
September onwards there will be an annual influx of students, which ideally should consist of
students who for 75 percent will be recruited out of Defense personnel (both military and
civilians) and for 25 percent from other sectors. Not only professionals from outside the
sphere of Defense, but also bachelor students at civilian universities have already indicated
their interest in following this mastertrack, so that this initiative has become another step on
the road to full acceptance in the Netherlands for intelligence as a legitimate field of study.

Structure
The structure of the program is as follows:
Thesis 15 ECTS
Research seminar 5 ECTS
Electives (5 ECTS each)
Defense Information,
Innovation & Knowledge
War, the Military & Media

Dynamics of Military
Innovation

Cybersecurity/warfare

Decisionmaking in Crisis &
War

Comparative Security &
Defense Policies

Constabulary Operations

Military Management &
Logistics (25 ECTS)

War Studies (25 ECTS)

Intelligence & Security (25
ECTS)

Elective

Elective

Elective

Strategic Military Asset
Management

International Law of Military
Operations

International Intelligence
Cooperation

Military Leadership & Human
Resource Management

Coercive Diplomacy

Methods & Analytic Concepts
in Intelligence

Strategizing & Organizing

Insurgency &
Counterinsurgency

Intelligence & Its Environment

Defense Economics &
Performance Management

Peacekeeping & Statebuilding

Intelligence Organizations &
Their Cultures

Tracks

Core Courses (5 ECTS each)
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Thesis 15 ECTS
War, Defense & Society

War & Warfare in the
(post)modern World

Contemporary Security &
Strategy

The master study starts with three compulsory core courses, each counting for five ECTS,1
which have to be taken by students of all three tracks:
•
•
•
•

War, Defense and Society
War and Warfare in the (Post)Modern World
Contemporary Security and Strategy.
At the end of their study the students write a thesis (Fifteen ECTS), preceded by a
course in research design (Five ECTS).

In this paper I will focus on the intelligence track, its structure and the reasons for setting the
track up the way we did.
The intelligence track is made up of five courses of five ECTS each:
•
•
•
•
•

Intelligence organizations & their cultures
Intelligence and its environment
Methods and analytic concepts in intelligence
International intelligence cooperation
An elective, e.g.
o Cybersecurity/warfare
o Constabulary operations
o Comparative security and defense policies
o Decisionmaking in crisis & war.

Considerations Behind the Program
1. There were several considerations that led to this program
2. The master should be accessible for both military and civilian students who have
achieved a bachelor in one of the relevant studies, such as war studies, political
science, international relations, history and so on, as well as for officers who are midcareer and will from now on be required to have a master’s degree before moving on
to their next rank.
3. The intelligence track should be of an academic nature aiming at reflection and
critical thinking about functions, concepts and contexts of intelligence, qualities that
are needed by individuals in a learning organization; it should not be a ‘how to’-,
skill-driven training course.
4. The intelligence track should focus on current developments and needs and on
possible future scenarios in the world of intelligence.
5. The intelligence track should not only be intended for (future) intelligence producers,
but also for (future) intelligence consumers.
1

ECTS = European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System. One ECTS accounts for
twenty-eight hours of study.
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6. Ideally, this intelligence track should become a track to be followed by personnel
from all Dutch intelligence and security services and qualified police officers.
7. Even more so, it should offer the opportunity to be transformed into a common
Dutch-Belgian intelligence academy.

Consequences for the Program
Currently, there is a backlog among MIVD-personnel regarding academic training. This
meant that there was so much interest in the program that not everybody who was willing to
follow the studies could be allowed to start immediately, because otherwise the primary
processes of the MIVD would have been seriously disrupted. It will take several years before
we will have caught up with this backlog. However, at a certain point in time this will have
been realized. From then on, the master will still accomodate those officers for whom the
study will be a career opportunity, beside those who have accomplished a bachelor study and
will flow in immediately from the college benches. Therefore this master, wich is actually a
one-year program, that normally would consist of forty-two weeks of forty hours of study
(which equals 60 ECTS = 1680 hours) is spread out over two years, during which classes are
concentrated on Fridays, taking eight so-called contact hours and leaving twelve hours for
selfstudy a week. This is felt to impinge as little as possible on office hours and at the same
time to prevent an overburdening of the student who tries to combine his master study with
his job accomplishments with.
The mix of students with different backgrounds and different degrees and kinds of
employment asks for special didactical arrangements and qualities. During the classes there
will be less frontal top-down teaching than usual in academic studies. Classes will be stongly
interactive, allowing for debates, in-class consignments, role-playing, guest lectures by
experts, and so on. Although the course is meant to be reflective the teaching staff will be
partly drawn from qualified intelligence personnel in order to relate as much as possible to
practices and terminology known among the students.
Having students who have already have a career in intelligence as well as students who are
relatievely new to this field made it necessary to develop a deficiency pre-master course for
the latter, requiring them to study introductory literature, which will be tested by both exam
questions and essays. Thus a certain commonality of understanding will be achieved at the
start of the mastertrack.
Another consequence from having professionally employed students is that their employer
may have certain requirements regarding the topic of the students’ master thesis. In the case
of the students who are employees of the MIVD there may be a tension between the sources
that are available to the students at their office and the material that is allowed to be
published in the public domain. As an academic institute the NLDA can only assess papers
and theses based on open sources. This may imply that students working for the MIVD will
write two versions of their thesis, one that will be brought up for academic assessment and
one that will live up to the requirements of the employer. Conversely, students who do not
work for an intelligence service may like to get access to material that has not yet been
declassified as they start their research or they may want to participate in an intelligence
environment for the purposes of their research. It has therefore been decided that at the end of
their first year of study students and the MIVD will meet each other for a thesis market,
where interests of students and requirements of the MIVD can be matched, whereafter there
will be enough time left to vet non-intelligence personnel in order to give them access.
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A Study of Intelligence
The master is expressly intended to give intelligence personnel a chance to step back from the
daily working processes and to reflect upon these processes, upon their temporal, contextual
and cultural boundedness and on possible futures that lie ahead. The aim of the course is to
develop in students the capacity for double-loop learning regarding the functions and
working methods of intelligence. On completion of the course they should be able to reflect
independently on the functionality of intelligence (both as information and as organizational
activity) and secrecy in different time frames and in diverse cultural settings.
Although part of the student population belongs to the realm of the practitioners the
intelligence track is thus not meant as a study for intelligence, but rather as a study of
intelligence. Even so, the student will be trained to translate between practice and reflection.
One of the reasons for this decision to emphasize the more theoretical aspects was that the
ministry of Defense has already its own training institute for teaching analytical methods and
skills, and so does the Dutch Civil Intelligence and Security Agency (AIVD). There is no
need to copy the work of these institutes, which are closer to the operational methods of the
services.
As the Dutch educational system makes a much stricter division between universities and
higher professional or vocational education than for instance the American system does, this
emphasis on reflection falls clearly into line with Dutch acedemic traditions. It is also part of
the mission and ambition of the NLDA, which is to provide thinking soldiers at the bachelor
level and officer scholars at the master’s level.
In this paper it is of course impossible to elaborate extensively on the reflective approach in
the program, but a brief overview of some of the questions that are addressed in the different
intelligence track courses may be sufficient:
From the course on Intelligence organizations & their cultures:
• Are we moving towards a more open society or towards a world persistently invested
with secrets?
• Does secrecy necessarily constitute a component of intelligence?
• Does secrecy lead to more politicization of intelligence than openness does? Or is it
just the other way round?
• Have the scales tipped too far into the direction of intelligence sharing?
• Do the costs of shielding information become prohibitive?
• Should intelligence agencies aim for reduction of uncertainty or for management or
even exploitation of uncertainty?
• Is it possible for bureaucracies to gather intelligence on networks or does it take
networks to gather intelligence on networks?
From the course on Intelligence & its environment:
• What is the difference intelligence makes in the decision-making process?
• Are intelligence organizations worth the money they cost?
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• What constitutes good quality in intelligence? How do intelligence organizations
adapt to changing task and value environments? Or even better: do they?
• How are intelligence organizations and their working processes shaped by past
experiences?
• Could intelligence agencies become obsolete?
• How many so-called intelligence revolutions have occurred and do we need another
one?
• Can politicization of intelligence be prevented?
From the course on Methods and analytic concepts in intelligence:
• What are the relative advantages of respectively formal, positivist methodology on the
one hand and intuition, constructivism or post-positivism on the other?
• What are the implications of the way we define the intelligence process (solving
puzzles, addressing mysteries, handling dilemmas, sense-making, creating
(counter)narratives) for the methodologies used?
• What are the implications of the emergence of non-state actors for the methodology
used by intelligence agencies? Does it favour the use of certain methodology, such as
social network analysis?
• What constitues centrality and cohesiveness in networks?
From the course on International intelligence cooperation:
• Does the special UK-USA intelligence relationship hamper closer intelligence
collaboration within the European Union?
• Does open sources intelligence hold a promise for closer international intelligence
cooperation?
• Does NATO intelligence analysis provide an example for UN intelligence analysis?
• How to create intelligence cooperation among coalitions of the willing, e.g. by
creating communities of interest?
• What is the role played by human rights considerations in intelligence liasion?
• How to create oversight over international intelligence cooperation?

A Study of Current and Future Developments
Whereas many intelligence courses elsewhere are taught within universities’ history
departments and although I myself, being the coordinator of the intelligence track, am a
trained historian, the emphasis in the intelligence track, as well as in the master as a whole, is
on the post-Cold War world. Of course the major historical developments in the field of
intelligence are touched upon (cf. the question: ‘How many so-called intelligence revolutions
have occurred?’ above), the historical roots of intelligence organizations and the historical
determination of their working methods are taught, but the main aim remains creating
awareness among the students of current concepts and contexts defining the intelligence
world and preparing the students for the future. If the intelligence community has to get rid of
its Cold War ‘anchors’ and maybe even reinvent itself in order to adapt to the changed
circumstances, the cutting through of the chains may as well start at the stage of education.
The Producer-Consumer Nexus
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From the very beginning the master was not only meant for intelligence producers but for
intelligence consumers as well. It is the understanding of the MIVD that an improved
knowledge of what intelligence is about will enhance the readiness of policy- and
decisionmakers to accept intelligence products. The MIVD has already started an intensive
program to induce intelligence consumers to formulate their intelligence requirements much
more clearly than has been the case in the past. At the moment this is still restricted to the
question of what types of information intelligence consumers would like to receive about
different targets in the near future. This endeavour is the outcome of the need to create
greater efficiency and to enhance both intelligence consumers’ and intelligence producers’
satisfaction regarding the usability of the products. This exercise works two ways: the
producers have to show the results they are asked for, but at the same time the consumers will
have to prove that they make use of the intelligence.
It is expected that this process is only the beginning of a much more intensive dialogue
between intelligence producers and consumers. A trend is becoming visible whereby
intelligence producers are not only the gatherers and providers of factual knowledge, but
become sense-makers and narrative creators adding meaning to facts. Another trend is that in
a world that is overloaded with information intelligence services will increasingly be asked to
authenticate information.
In both trends the traditional support function of intelligence, whereby intelligence officials
hand over their information and leave the room before the actual decisions are made will
make place for a situation in which intelligence officials and decision-makers are gathered
around the table or involved in an ongoing iterative process of redefining problems and
dilemmas. In order to improve the dissemination of intelligence both in a traditional support
setting and a new exchange setting students should be made aware of the different rationales
that guide the intelligence professional and the decision-maker. Consequently, intelligence
dissemination is taught as a two-way process in stead of the one way street view from the
point of intelligence producers that one often finds in intelligence text books.
A possible issue that springs from the enhanced role of intelligence producers as sensemakers is that the public at large may not be ready yet to accept the fact that intelligence
officials exchange their support function for a function that brings them more or less at an
equal footing as decision-makers. This is one of the reasons why it is not even excluded that
students of the intelligence track may have academic jobs or journalism as a prospect, since
they will shape the opinions and expectations of the general public regarding intelligence on
the road to such a new intelligence paradigm.2 Consequently, one of the items addressed in
the track is expectation management by intelligence and security agencies. It should be noted
that even with this expansion of the professional field for which the master may prepare, it
remains explicitly oriented toward intelligence functions of the government, the course is not
intended for business or corporate intelligence.
Standardization

Over the past there has been a keen interest in the possibility of getting a master’s degree in
intelligence among different types of officials in the Netherlands. The growing need for
academization that has characterized the training of military officers over the past fifteen
2

Cf. R. Arcos, ‘Academics as Strategic Stakeholders of Intelligence Organizations: A View
from Spain’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26 (2013): 333.
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years has been noticed among the police force as well. This is especially true in the field of
intelligence, where there is a clamour for intelligence led policing, while simultaneously
there is an understanding that traditional law and order functions differ very much from
intelligence tasks. A clear knowledge of how intelligence works or should work is all the
more necessary since there has always been a great fear of mixing police and intelligence
functions in the Netherlands since the Second World War.
An effort is also being undertaken to interest the AIVD for this program, which although
initiated by the MIVD, should be able to attract AIVD-officials both as students an as
teaching staff.
Internationalization

Both being small countries confronted with budgettary reductions, especially in the field of
Defense, there is a growing talk of Defense cooperation between the Netherlands and
Belgium. It is generally understood that cooperation at the operational level would greatly
benefit from common training and education. It is hoped for that this cooperation in the field
of the military can be expanded to the field of intelligence education, which would be a great
challenge in the light of the different cultures in both the intelligence and the academic
worlds of the Netherlands and Belgium. From September onward the courses will be taught
in English, so that military personnel from other allied nations may join as well (Interest has
already been shown by the German armed forces). But I myself, being a so-called
NetherBelg, i.e. a Dutchman working in the Netherlands, but living in Belgium, may be the
right person to stand at the beginning of this unfolding history.
More generally, it is to be expected that whenever the Netherlands armed forces will operate
abroad, they will do so in constantly changing international compositions. This makes it
necessary to give students an idea about different national intelligence cultures as they exist,
not only among opponents, but also among friendly troops or nations whose cooperation is
sought. Comparison between intelligence organizations is an essential part of the course on
“Intelligence organizations and their culture” and attention to collaboration is given in the
course on “International intelligence cooperation.”
Much less than in the time of the Cold War can it be expected that intelligence cooperation
can be based on a simple exchange of bits of informtion according to the rules of quid pro
quo. Intelligence relations with e.g. Pakistan or Georgia are of a different nature from those
with the UK or Germany. Furthermore, threats like terrorism and cyberattcks in whatever
form demand much more international collaboration than the fight against espionage ever
did. New international and transnational organizations, such as the UN in peacekeeping and
peace enforcing operations or the European Union, develop their own intelligence centers
where nationals of different states collaborate. The students should learn what the conditions
are for international intelligence cooperation beyond the all too simple idea of quid pro quo.
Theories about trust, institution building or relative cost advantage are taught to be applied in
specific contexts.

Conclusion
Participating in the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) is another
effort at internationalization, through which I hope our students will ultimately profit. I hope
to learn from the much-respected experience gathered in the association and maybe every
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now and then chip in experiences from the Low Countries, that lie at the intersection of the
Atlantic world and continental Europe.
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Annex. The Intelligence Track Courses Outlines
Intelligence Organizations and Their Cultures
WEEK
SUBJECT
1 Secrecy and uncertainty
2 Whose secrets?
3 Intelligence and secrecy: what is new?
4 National cultures of intelligence and secrecy, part I: US Intelligence
5 National cultures of intelligence and secrecy, part II: A European culture or
European cultures?
6 National cultures of intelligence and secrecy, part III: The Middle East, Asia and
Africa
7 Intelligence reform or intelligence revolution?
8 The other revolutions: Technology, information and revolution in military affairs
(RMA)
9 The future of intelligence and secrecy
10 Final Exam

Intelligence and its Environment
WEEK
SUBJECT
1
Intelligence and its environment
2 Intelligence organizations adapting to their environments
3 Intelligence and its past
4 Intelligence and its consumers
5 Intelligence failures and intelligence costs
6 Oversight and accountability
7 Intelligence and law
8 Intelligence and ethics
9 No seminar
10 Research paper due

Methods and Analytic Concepts in Intelligence
SUBJECT
WEEK
1 Intelligence Theory
2 Intelligence Sensemaking
3 SNA in intelligence and Social Science
4 Social Network data I
5 Social Network data II
6 Centrality and Prestige
7 Cohesive subgroups
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8
9
10

Affiliations and overlappings
Presentation
Research paper due

International Intelligence Cooperation
WEEK
SUBJECT
1 Foreign Liaison
2 UKUSA or Five Eyes
3 NATO
4 The European Union
5 UN Peacekeeping
6 Coalitions of the Willing
7 Communities of Interest
8 The ethics of intelligence co-operation
9 No seminar
10 Research paper due
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